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Abstract: 
The paper examines Corruption and Challenges of Sustainable Inclusive Growth in Nigeria. 
The paper adopts the theory of two publics as its framework of analysis. The theory explains 
the prevalence of corruption between and among public servants in Nigeria, which affects the 
attainment of sustainable inclusive growth. Corruption in Nigeria is caused by lack of 
accountability, transparency and good governance; poor leadership; monopolization of power 
by government officials; the utilization of discretionary powers by politicians and bureaucrats 
over the formulation and implementation of the rules and regulations and allocations of 
projects. Using system equation ordered by variables the paper revealed an indirect link 
between corruption and poverty and a significant negative impact on the attainment of 
inclusive growth in Nigeria. The test of causality using Wald test also revealed that there is a 
unidirectional causality running from corruption to inclusive growth. The paper therefore, 
argues that corruption challenges the attainment of sustainable inclusive growth in the 
country both in the short run and long run. This is because it drains and cripples the available 
national income for productive activities; discourages savings habit and increases debt burden 
in the country; hinders the Nigerian state to allocate resources for distributive purposes 
among the constituent units thereby; intensifies level of inequality and abject poverty; 
generates infrastructural and social services decay; and a general decline in the living 
standard of the ordinary Nigerian citizens. 
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The challenges of development in the third world nations could be attributed to Personal Rule 
theory (Jackson and Roseberg, 1982; and Sandbrook, 1985). The theory states that the 
personalization of state by a leader impedes national development because his personal 
interest overrides national interest. The phenomenon motivates the leader to employ dubious 
mechanisms in all its ramifications to consolidate power and perpetuate political 
aggrandizement thus clashes with developmental objectives of the states. Besides, political 
decision makers use state and its organs as avenues for misappropriating the available 
resources at the detriment of the ordinary Nigerian citizens. This arrests development 
potentials since corruption hinders efficient allocation of resources for the attainment of 
inclusive growth.  
 
Corruption and mismanagement of resources contribute greatly to the challenges of 
development in the third world nations (IMF, 1989; and World Bank, 1989). Bangura (1989) 
contended with internal factors as advanced by the IMF and the World Bank to be 
responsible for the crisis of development in the third world nations however, he considered 
the factors as secondary. For instance, Bangura (1989) identified the implications of 
mismanagement and corruption on the crisis of development as contributory rather than 
causative. He also argued that the crisis of development in the post-colonial states could 
largely be attributed to the contradictions created by the advanced capitalist world. This 
motivated Olukoshi (1989) to argue that the crisis: could be traced to the contradictions 
inherent in the pattern of development, namely dependent capitalism, pursued by most 
African countries. Even in the absence of corruption and mismanagement, it could not have 
been possible to manage African economies in such a way as to permanently avoid crisis 
because inherent in the capitalist system are seeds of periodic, structural and conjectural crisis 
(Olukoshi, 1989:23).  
 
The prevalence of abject poverty in the global south could be attributed to globalization. 
Globalization advocates for free market economy, minimal state intervention in the 
management of the economy, economic interchange across national boundaries and adoption 
of liberal democracy in global politics. The wave of globalization was influenced by the 
failure of the IMF and the World Bank in the 1970s to regulate exchange rates. This affected 
stability in the international economic relations. The problem necessitated the Bretton Woods 
institutions to impose adjustment programmes as conditionalities for external loan facility. 
The conditionalities are privatization, devaluation, deregulation, trade liberalization and 
liberal democracy. Nigeria, a country confronted by economic crisis requires external 
financing thus, adopted the programmes. These programmes had brought unfavourable 
exchange rates and terms of trade; intensified corruption, poverty, debt crisis, unemployment, 
inequality and falling standard of the ordinary citizens; and eroded the political sovereignty 
of Nigeria. These hinder the attainment of transparency, accountability and good governance.  
 
To contain the menace of abject poverty, unemployment and inequality, the institutions for 
global governance and administration as well as development partners encourage and 
motivate the governments of developing states to implement sustainable development agenda 
via the attainment of inclusive growth. Therefore, this paper examines how corruption 
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2.1: Corruption and Inclusive Growth: What Works, Works not and why? 
Correlation exists between corruption and economic growth because payments of bribes to 
bureaucrats motivate them to hasten approval of projects, contracts and disbursement of 
resources (Egunjobi, 2013). Advocates of the school believe that corruption reintroduces 
efficiency in the bureaucracy that was hitherto jeopardized by poor leadership and 
insufficient remuneration henceforth influences economic growth (Acemoglu and Verdier, 
1998; Friendrich, 1972; Huntington, 1968; and Nye, 1967). They believed that bribery 
induces efficient allocation of resources, provision of social services and reduces bureaucratic 
redtapism. Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968) extended their arguments linking the dynamics 
of corruption and it effect on eliminating rigidities imposed by the government thus impacts 
positively on investment in the economy.  
 
Impliedly, corruption serves as a morale booster that eliminates administrative bottlenecks 
and promotes growth in the economy. Similarly, a correlation exists between economic 
growth and incidence of corruption. The productivity theory of corruption argues that wise 
investment of the proceeds of corruption could contribute to rapid economic growth (Aluko, 
2008). For instance, in 1962, a State Governor in the US took bribe of $8 million invested it 
and over 5000 people were employed (Sam Aluko, 2008). However, ethical economists are 
against developing an economy with iniquity. 
 
The second school of thought argues that corruption militates against economic growth 
(Aliyu and Elijah, 2008; Gould and Amaro-Reynes, 1983; Krueger, 1974; Mauro, 1995; 
McMullan, 1961; Myrdal, 1968; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Tanzi, 1998, Tanzi and Davoodi, 
1997; and United Nations, 1989). They believed that corruption hinders economic growth, 
distorts free market operation and prevents efficient and sufficient allocation of resources. 
Egunjobi (2013) adds that corruption is more pronounced in sectors that could not easily be 
detected and perceived. The argument downplays relevance of critical sectors ie education 
and health that seem to be glaring to all and sundry. Although, corruption increases the size 
and scope of public investment, equally reduces productivity since public officials 
compromise tax collection and alikes at the detriment of national interest.  
 
Study conducted by Mauro (1995) on the effect of corruption on growth of per capital GDP 
that covered six countries between 1960 and 1985 discovered that, decrease in one standard 
deviation in the corruption index led to the increase of 0.8 percent of the annual per capital 
GDP growth rate. In a related study Mauro (1997) argued that corruption increased the 
allocations of public investment above the required resources. This motivated Akai et al 
(2005) to quantify the extent to which project allocations were inflated with a view to 
misappropriating the resources. The attitudes inform the relative injustice and untrust among 
public officials which demonstrate lack of adherence to ethical code of conduct. This 
correlates with the earlier arguments presented by Gould and Amaro-Reynes (1983), United 
Nations (1989), Mauro (1995; 1997), and Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) where bureaucrats 
diverted public resources to sectors that bribes could easily be collected and misappropriated 
thus undermining productivity at the detriment of the social values.               
 
The effects of corruption on direct and indirect growth was carried out between 1970 and 
1985 by Mo (2001) using the long term growth rates of per capita GDP and analyzed the 
rates through investment, human capital and political stability variables. He submitted that in 
an indirect effect, a unit increase in the corruption index reduces per capital growth rate by 
about 0.545 percent. However, in direct effect the author argued that it was insignificant 
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when Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and two-stage Least Squares (2SLS) were employed and 
estimated. It became noticeable when the investment, human capital and political instability 
are controlled by the government.     
 
Using a panel and cross-sectional data for twenty-five countries Abed and Davoodi (2002) 
investigated the effect of corruption on transitional economies between 1994 and 1998. Their 
investigations discovered that economic growth was directly related to the lower rate of 
corruption in both the panel and cross-sectional regression estimated. They argued that the 
level of corruption index was only one percent significant. Although, study conducted by 
Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) discovered negative effect of corruption on economic growth, 
coefficients of 2SLS regression model were insignificant. Despite this, Rock and Bonett 
(2004) averred that significant correlation exists between corruption and economic growth in 
the newly industrialized economies of East Asia ie China, Indonesia, Thailand and Korea. 
Therefore, concluded that corruption promotes economic growth in these countries. 
 
In exploring the relationship between corruption and economic growth from 1986 to 2007 
Aliyu and Elijah (2008) adopted Barro-type endogenous growth model and employed Engle –
Granger (1987) co-integration and Error Correlation Mechanism (ECM) techniques and 
analyzed the variables of government capital expenditure, human capital development and 
total volume of employment. The outcome confirmed that corruption has negative effect on 
growth. Additionally, corruption exerts negative effect on human capital and total 
employment but impacts positively on government expenditure. The development was not 
unconnected with inflated public expenditure geared towards misappropriating certain 
percentage of the resources.  
 
Pellegrini and Gertagh (2004) centered their arguments on indirect transmission channel of 
investment, trade policy, schooling and political stability. Results showed that one standard 
deviation increase in the corruption index was associated with a decrease in the investment 
potentials of 2.46 percent resulting to the increase in economic growth by only 0.34 percent 
per annum. Similarly, a standard deviation increase in the corruption index was associated 
with a decrease in the growth index by 0.19 percent thus a decrease in economic growth by 
0.30 percent per annum. The phenomenon motivated Pellegrini and Gertagh (2004) to 
conclude that the combination of the effects of the transmission channels showed 8 percent 
effect of corruption on growth. 
 
The magnitude of corruption in a state is determined by the prevailing economic status 
(Egunjobi, 2013). The argument was earlier raised and confirmed by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993) and Ali and Isse (2003) when they averred that where the economic situation of a 
country is poor there is high tendency for the prevalence of high corruption perception index. 
Conversely, they found out that a country with good macroeconomic performance has greater 
tendency to experience low manifestation of corruption. By implication, the country acquires 
the potentials of achieving economic growth and development. Besides, it is assumed that 
manifestation of corrupt practices is directly related to economic stagnation and miscarriage 
of opportunity. The observation was concord by Lipset and Lenz (2000) when they argued 
that hindrance to opportunity via growth as envisaged by the state could be justified on the 
pretext of race, parochial, ethnic sentiment and chauvinism, and lack of physical and human 
resources. Furthermore, they believed that where cultural values promote achievements and 
goal realization but deny access to propensity of opportunities high degree of corruption 
prevails.    
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The crowding-out effect of corruption was explored by Adewale (2001) from 1996 to 2009 in 
Nigeria, when he adopted and employed simulation approach and Error Correlation 
Mechanism (ECM) to address the problem of spurious regression. In addition, he employed 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to ensure the degree of stationary of the variables 
and co-integration of the properties of the data. The author found out that there exist a 
significant relationship between corruption and economic growth. Similarly, Ordinary Least 
Squares Technique was employed by Fabayo et al (2011) to investigate the effect of 
corruption on investment in Nigeria. Annual corruption perception index was adopted 
between 1996 and 2000 and discovered that Nigeria was ranked in the low index which 
indicates high level of corruption in the country. Therefore, results to low investment 
potentials and steady economic growth. A robust study on corruption and economic growth 
was associated with Akindele (2005) where production function that involved the variables of 
labour, capital and political stability were conducted. Results showed that corruption has 
negative relationship with economic growth and retarded and arrested growth potentials. 
 
2.2 Inclusive Growth: Does poverty reduction, equality of opportunity and employment 
generation lend Credence?  
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2013b) defines inclusive 
growth as a situation:   Where the gap between the rich and the poor is less pronounced and 
the “growth dividend” is shared in a fair way that results in improvements in living standards 
and outcomes that matter for people’s quality of life (eg good health, jobs and skills, clean 
environment, community support). 
 
For World Bank (2009) inclusive growth refers to: Growth that I sufficient to lift large 
numbers out of poverty and growth that includes the largest part of the country’s force in the 
economy The international Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG) conceptualizes 
inclusive growth by giving more prominence to active participation of citizens in the 
economy. Thus: Places its emphasis on participation so that in addition to shairing in the 
benefits of growth, people actively participate in the wealth process and have a say in the 
orientation of that process (Ramos and Ranieri, 2013).  
 
Inclusive growth from the perspective of African Development Bank refers to: tackling 
discrimination of the most marginalized groups is an intrinsic part of the inclusive growth 
process as well as key outcome. Groups that have suffered discrimination are those that have 
been left behind in poverty reduction and economic development, efforts-helping these 
groups to participate in and benefit from economic activities is a cornerstone of inclusive 
growth (Klusen, 2010). 
 
The G20 as part of its commitment to include inclusive growth in the Post-2015 development 
agenda recognizes that: Too many of our citizens have yet to participate in the economic 
global recovery that is underway. The G20 must strive not only for strong, sustainable and 
balanced growth, but also for a more inclusive pattern of growth that will better mobilize the 
talent of our populations (G20, 2013).   
 
The need to speed the rate of achieving inclusive growth in the international economies has 
become the agenda for institutions for global governance and administration as well as 
governments of many developing states. Despite this, variations in defining the concept pose 
a serious challenge to its actualization. For instance, the African Development Bank argues 
that some of these concepts are vague and do not lend themselves to easy quantitative 
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operationalizations, whilst others are quite specific but do not capture the essence of the 
concept. Moreover, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the 
academia have all provided a range of policy documents on closely related concepts eg pro-
poor growth and equal opportunity (Klasen, 2010).     
 
The extent to which a state reduces the level of poverty that bedevils its citizens is a function 
of effective policy making and evaluative mechanisms. Therefore, democratic ideals under 
democratic government ought to have a stable and dynamic policy framework that could not 
only alleviate poverty but also eradicate it on the political and economic map of a state. 
However, World Bank (2000) argued that not all growth potentials could reduce poverty 
despite the efforts that are being made by international donor agencies in developing 
countries. The argument motivated Ortiz and Cummins (2011) to argue that over 1.2 billion 
people across the global were living on less than $1.25 per day and the figure was equivalent 
to 24% of the world population.  
 
In an argument raised by Ravallion (2013) and confirmed by World Bank (2013b) that 
between 1990 and 2010 the level of poverty across the globe was reduced by one half. This 
inspired confidence among the development partners that eradicating abject poverty could be 
achieved in the next generation. However, study conducted by Chandy et al (2013) presented 
a counteractive position because it becomes very difficult to reduce poverty or get it to zero 
level since the composition of some people have been replaced by fragile states or suffer 
discrimination and social exclusion. Therefore, the success of eradicating poverty depends 
upon the benefits to be derived from inclusive growth. Indeed, Ortiz and Cummins (2011) 
had earlier argued that failure by the states to change their growth potentials and pattern of 
distribution via inclusive growth could make the world population of billion people to spend 
800 years before they could achieve 10% of global income. 
 
Macroeconomic stability and economic openness are central to achieving growth and 
development (CAFOD, 2014). This position has its genesis from the strategies envisaged by 
the growth theories and development schema. Therefore, the clarion call for sustainable 
development by the development partners, international financial institutions and their 
affiliates motivated and widen the scope of growth and development strategies to cover issues 
not only poverty, unemployment and inequality but also social protection, investment in 
human capital, strong institutions, progressive tax policies and non-discrimination, social 
inclusion and participation (EU Green Paper, 2010 and G20, 2012).  
 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012) identifies three major 
challenges of growth that requires urgent global attention ie abject and extreme poverty, 
unemployment and inequality. OECD argues that in recent years the implementation of 
growth and development agenda had not been achieved because the benefits have not cut 
across all the groups. It further argues that the phenomenon has only intensified widening 
inequality among the marginalized groups. This conclusion motivated CAFOD (2014) to 
quantify the inequality believing that: Today, the gap between the rich and poor is widening 
almost everywhere. Earlier on, the debate was already presented by OECD (2012b) when it 
reported that within the spectrum of OECD countries only the scenario reads that: It is the 
widest in 30 years.        
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To quantify the level of inequality Oxfam (2014) reported that the rich 85 people across the 
globe own the amount of resources as the bottom of 3.5 billion populations. This 
demonstrates the intensity of inequality and calls for redesigning strategies to achieve 
inclusive growth. Indeed, the increasing prevalence and manifestation of inequality has been 
a serious challenge to match for meeting sustainable growth and inclusive growth. 
 
Inequality becomes a major challenge to match for the attainment of inclusive growth not 
only for the emerging markets and developing countries but also among the advanced 
capitalist world (Dabla-Norris et al, 2015). The intensity of the widening inequality across the 
globe has received considerable attention amidst development partners. President Barrack 
Obama quantifies the widening income inequality as the “the defining challenge of our time”. 
A survey carried out by Pew Research Centre discovered that the gap between the rich and 
the poor has become a serious challenge to more than 60 percent of the respondents 
worldwide (PRC, 2014). Additionally, Pope Francis was unsupportive of the prevailing 
economy of inclusion across the globalized world (Dabla-Norris, 2015). Therefore, inclusive 
growth becomes relevant in contemporary match to attainment of sustainable development. 
Equality has been a crucial component of an ideal society irrespective of differences in 
ideological orientation, cultural upbringing, religious denomination and inclination. The wave 
of globalization and its forces have permeated many nation-states and become a contributory 
factor for the spread of inequality. The dynamics of inequality reflects lack of income and 
opportunity (Dabla-Norris, 2015).    
               
3.0:  Methodology 
3.1: Sources of Data 
Annual time series data covering the period 1981-2014 was employed for the study. The data 
was sourced from various sources that have been publicly acknowledged. These are 
Transparently International, Central Bank of Nigeria and the World Bank. Due to paucity of 
data, the corruption perception index (CPI) from 1981 to 1993 was obtained by a backward 3-
year moving average. This is in line with the theory of rational expectation hypothesis which 
state that “expectations are rational in the sense that expectations and events differ only by a 
random forecast error”...., Muth, (1961), cited by Jhingan, 2010:638).   
 
3.2: Model Specification and Estimation Procedure 
To estimate the impact of corruption on the attainment of inclusive growth, a system of 
equations order by variable were estimated through VECM to analysis the impact of 
corruption on inclusive growth objective. Marxist School of thought  argued that corruption is 
determined primarily by the prevailing social relations of production; that is the mode of 
production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in 
general (Marx, 1847). In  a production relation where the people in government and political 
offices constitute a cabal  that controls the national resources, live above the law and are ‘first 
among equals’. The rest of the citizens are left to die in abject poverty. Therefore, the Marxist 
Perspective clearly identifies a key consequence of corruption as poverty. In line with 
Marxist theory and other extant literatures that corruption impacts on the attainment of 
inclusive growth, a multiple regression equation is specified below (Anoruo and Braha,  
2005; Mustapha, Kilishi, and Akanbi, 2015). 
 
1......6543210 tPRGDPPOVFDIDDRLINCGCOR    
 
 




 COR= corruption  
 RL = Rule of law 
 UNEM= Unemployment rate 
  POV= Poverty level 
 FDI= Foreign Direct Investment 
 .t   = A white noise error term assumed to be normally and identically distributed. 
Apriori, we expect a negative relationship between all the independents variables and the 
depended variable. 
 
3.3: Measurement of Variables 
In the literature, corruption could be of different dimensions depending on the depth and 
sector involved. Therefore, for this study corruption was proxy by Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) sourced from Transparency International and has been widely used in empirical 
works this inclusive (Mustapha, Kilishi, and Akanbi, 2015). The concept of inclusive on the 
other hand is relatively new in growth literatures and this explains its difficulty in 
measurement. According to Anand, et, al., (2013) inclusive growth can be termed to consists 
of two parts; rate of growth in  income (growth in GDP per capita) and (b) change in income 
distribution using change in Gini coefficient (or equity index). In line with the above, 
researchers (see Anand, et, al., 2013; Aoyagi and Ganelli, 2015) have developed an equation 














Where  is the inclusive growth (INCG) and  and  represent the change income per 
capita and change in equity (Gini coefficient) over time 
 
As earlier mentioned inclusive growth is multidimensional in nature and encompasses not 
only growth in income equity, but also other indicators that aid inclusiveness and equity like: 
declining rate of unemployment, poverty and equality of access among others. In view of 
this, inclusive growth is captured both in it aggregated (INCG ) and disaggregated term as 
poverty level (POV), rule of law (RL) and growth in income (RGDP). Poverty rate (POV) as 
an indicator of inclusive growth was proxy by Per Capital private consumption expenditure 
(PPCE). The PPCE reflects well-being over some period. It is argued that consumption 
expenditure reflects not only the affordability of the household based on its current income 
but also ability to access credit market or resort to savings to smoothen consumption 
(Quartey, 2005; Sin-Yu Ho and Odhiambo, 2011).  It is calculated as private consumption 
expenditure divided by the total population. Apriori, the more endemic corruption becomes, 
the more the manifestation of abject poverty therefore, there is the need to ensure equality of 
access to economic resources thereby opening opportunities for all and sundry in the path to 
attainment of inclusive growth. Thus, in this study equality of access was proxy by quality of 
rule of law (RL) measured by Law and Order sourced from international Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG). In the same vein, Real Gross Domestic Product (RGDP) was used as a proxy for 
growth in income and expected to be negatively related to corruption. As control variables, 
rate of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and total domestic debt were introduced. It is 
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expected that FDI should be negatively related to corruption, while total debt are expected to 
be a positive function of corruption.   
 
3.4: Estimation Procedure 
Estimation of equation (1) commenced with examination of the stochastic properties of the 
time series data used in order to avoid spurious regression. This was carried out by 
conducting a unit root test using Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Philips-Perron (PP).  
The test for the long run relationships among the variables are carried out following Johansen 
(1988) methodology. The choice of the Johansen Cointegration test is based on its superiority 
over the Engle-Granger methodology because the latter is unsuitable for more than two 
variables and does not report more than one cointegrating vector.  . If the Johansen-Juselious 
suggest the existence of long run relationship we develop an error correction model in VECM 








































































































Where  and  are the coefficients, and .i  is residuals. The itect    is the lagged value of the 
cointegrating regression of equation (4) to (10).  
 
The VECM model as shown in equations (4-10) will then be estimated out of which we now 
make a system equation order by variable to investigate the impact of corruption on inclusive 
growth indicators. If the  , the coefficient of corruption is found positive or negative  and 
significant using the probability value in each of the equations, we conclude that corrupt 
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practices have positive or negative influence  on our dependent variables as shown in 
equation (4) to (10) with the exclusion of equation (5).     
 
4.0:  Result and Discussion 
4.1: Pre Estimation Test 
The result of the unit root test is presented in table (I) below. From the test, the result of both 
Augmented Dicky Fuller and Philip Peron tests revealed that all the variables were stationary 
at first difference I(I) with exception of (FDI) and GFC that was only stationary at level with 
intercept and trend using ADF statistics. However, PP confirms that the variable is stationary 
at first difference.  The study therefore concludes that the variables are integrated of order 1 




Table 1: Unit root test results 















COR -0.7651 -1.0507 -2.8878 -3.0099 -9.2167* -7.6853* -13.8260* -7.6921* 1(1) 
INCG -2.853*** -2.3936 -2.8125 -2.3763 -7.0947* -4.4718* -6..6760* -4.3934* 1(1) 
RL -1.6787 -2.2010 -1.5097 -2.0969 -3.4275**  -3.4785** -3.3349*** -3.4853** 1(1) 
RGDP 1.7606 -1.9170 -1.8750 -1.9981 -4.2328* 3.3454* -4.9203* 4.8124* 1(1) 
POV -1.6923 -1.1679 -3.4735 -3.1490 -7.7123* -7.7627* -8.2920* -8.4167* 1(1) 
FDI -1.0025 0.5734 -4.7137* -4.6623* -11.1864* 11.2837* -11.0037* 11.1014* 1(1) 
DD -1.5937 -1.7042 -1.4152 -1.1010 -4.3054* -4.2354* -4.3368* -4.3303* 1(1) 
ADF† and PP† = unit root tests with constant.  
ADF‡ and PP‡ = unit root tests with constant and trend.  
*,** and *** indicates statistical significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
Source: Author’s Computation using E-view 9.1 
The stationarity of the variables at the same order of integration supports the test for cointegration using Engle Granger methodology. To test for 
cointegration, the selection optimum lag order becomes necessary. For this study, minimum Schwarz Information Criteria (SIC) was used to determine the 
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Table 2: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
 
     
              
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
              
0 -33.20971 NA   2.91e-08  2.513107  2.833737  2.619387 
1  136.0617  253.9071  1.71e-11 -5.003855  -2.438817* -4.153618 
2  212.5844   81.30535*   4.94e-12*  -6.724023* -1.914577  -5.129828* 
              
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
       
Using the optimum lag selected the result of the test of cointegration provides evidence for the existence of at least three cointegrating equations 
at 5% level of significance as shown in table (3) 




Table 3. Johansen Cointegration Test Results 
       
       
Hypothesized       
Null  Alternative 
 
Eigenvalue 






       
       
 r = 0  r  ≥ 1  0.869259  65.10512*  46.2314  170.0686*  125.6154 
       
r ≤ 1 r  ≥ 2  0.628914  31.7223  40.0776  104.9634*  95.7537 
       
r ≤ 2 r  ≥ 3  0.587358  28.3256  33.8769  73.2411**  69.8189 
       
r ≤ 3 r  ≥ 4  0.491828  21.6619  27.5843  44.9155  47.8561 
       
r ≤ 4 r  ≥ 5  0.329324  12.7829  21.1316  23.2536  29.7971 
       
r ≤ 5 r  ≥ 6  0.197892  7.0564  14.2646  10.4706  15.4947 
       
r ≤ 6 r  ≥ 7  0.101200  3.4142  3.8415  3.4142  3.8415 
r indicates the number of cointegrating vectors. *Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% level of 
significance. 
Source: Authors’ Computations using E-view 9.1 
 
This allows the study to proceed with the test of Causality without fear of spurious 
regression. The study  applied an error correction based on the Granger causality test to 
establish the flow of relationship between the variables in the model in both the short run and 
long run using Wald test. The results of the application of this technique is presented in table 
(4).below  




TABLE 4. Granger Non-Causality Test Results 

































































∆INCG  [χ2] 71.0351 (1)*   4.663 (1)** 3.6265 (1)*** 23.5058 (1)* 18.9109 (1)* 0.5846 (1) 36.6092 (1)* 
         
∆ COR [χ2]  14.136 (1)** 0.02196 (1)   3.396 (1)***  0.3563 (1) 8.4129 (1)* 1.4191 (1)  0.3421 (1) 
         
∆ RL [χ2] 6.3957 (1)  4.6135 (1)** 0.4743 (1)  2.9512 (1)** 0.3704 (1)  1.7576 (1)  2.4009 (1) 
         
∆ FDI[χ2]  1.9594 (1)  0.1705 (1) 0.0650 (1)  0.0112 (1)  0.8232 (1) 0.0699 (1)  0.4897 (1) 
         
∆ DD[χ2] 18.9084 (1)*  2.777 (1)***  9.7386 (1)* 1.8237 (1) 0.0035 (1)  9.2457 (1)* 2.7772 (1) 
         
∆ POV [χ2]  6.9076 (1)  0.8552 (1) 1.7608 (1) 0.0363 (1)  0.2575 (1)  0.8006 (1)  1.6174 (1) 
         
∆ RGDP [χ2] 
 7.1663 (1)  0.0579 (1) 2.625 
(1)*** 
0.4344 (1)  2.769 (1)*** 2.7174 (1)*** 0.1692 (1)  
JB = 12.42727 (0.5720); ARCH [χ2, 1] = 460.7566(0.3284);  
 LM Stat @lag 1 = 35.3168 (0.9289) 
 
 
Notes*, **, and ** *denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Figures in parenthesis indicates the number of degree of freedom .  
Source: Authors’ Computations using E-view 9.1 





From table (4) the test of causality between corruption and inclusive growth index (INCG) 
denotes a unidirectional causality running from corruption to inclusive growth at 5% level of 
significant in the short run. In general, all the endogenous variables cause INCG with the 
exception of poverty in the short run mostly at 1% level of significant. In addition, there is a 
long run causality running from all the variables to INCG going by probability value of 
overall causality in the inclusive growth index equation. This is not surprising because in an 
environment where rent-seeking behavior is endemic achievements of macroeconomic policy 
objectives of declining rate of unemployment, poverty, growth in income, declining gap of 
inequality that accumulate into growth that is inclusive remain futile. Thus, the behaviour of 
all the variables in the model determines the extent of the inclusiveness of growth in the long 
run.  .  
 
 
Looking at the result of equation (5) where we have corruption as depended variables, going 
by the chi-square probability value of 0.0654, a short run unidirectional causality flowing 
from rule of law to corruption. A further X-ray of the short run analysis of chain of causality 
shows that there is a feedback relationship between domestic debt (DD) and corruption 
(COR) at 1% level of significance, indicating that in Nigeria, domestic debt causes corruption 
and corruption also causes domestic debt. The above result implies rule of law and 
accumulation of debt have causal effects on the level of corruption. It is worthy to note that 
the high debt burden faced by the country might be because debt facilities as instruments of 
stabilizations serve as an avenue for rent seeking among the political office holders. In 
addition, the significance of the chi- square value of overall causality of the same equation 
confirms the existence of bi-directional causality between corruption and inclusive growth in 
the long run in Nigeria.  
 
In the rule of law equation (equation 6) with the exception of  INCG, FDI, and RGDP  that 
granger cause rule of law (RL) in the shotr run, there is no either short run or long run 
causality running from all the other endogenous variables to rule of law. Thus the null 
hypothesis that rule of law does not Granger cause INCG, and INCG does not granger cause 
(RL) in the system is rejected at 10% level of significant, hence confirming a bidirectional 
causality between the two.  
 
The FDI equation support the hypothesis that there is no causality running from all the other 
endogenous variables in the model to foreign direct investment either in the short run or in 
the long run. These results further confirm the existence of short and long run unidirectional 
causality running from FDI to rule of law, INCG, and RDGP. Economic implication of this 
result is that growth in income (RGDP), inclusive growth and effectiveness of rule of law are 
all functions of foreign direct investment. Further in the test of causality, the result revealed 
that poverty, corruption and INCG causes domestic debt both in the short run and long run 
going by the chi-square value of the endogenous variables and that of overall causality. This 
result confirmed a bidirectional relationship between domestic debt and corruption as well as 
between INCG and domestic debt (DD). 
 
A unidirectional causality exists from FDI to corruption at the 5% level. This implies that the 
nature of foreign direct investment in Nigeria perpetuates corrupt practices. The result also 
reveals that causality flows from Growth to corruption at 1% level of significance. .  




 Moreover, there is no flow of Causality of whatever form  between poverty  and corruption 
while a unidirectional causality running from corruption, foreign direct investment, domestic 
debt and growth in income (RGDP) at 10% level of significant. This correlates with the 
findings of Umeh, Richard and Iyoboyi, (2013) and Egunjobi,(2013). It is apposite therefore, 
corruption of whatever dimension discourages investment in real sector due to it positive 
impacts on cost to businesses, encourage waste, and in most cases serves as avenue for 
leakages from the circular flow, most especially if it is not reinvested within the economy as 
in Nigeria case.   
 
It is worth mentioning that although there is no direct causality of whatever form between 
corruption and poverty in the short run, but one could not rule out the possibility of an 
indirect causality between the two variables. For instance, a long run causality running from 
poverty to corruption could be confirmed from the result of corruption equation, while 
corruption causes growth in income (RGDP). The implication is that a corrupt economy 
would negatively influence growth objectives thereby causes poverty, while a poverty 
endemic environment could push an individual to collect bribes in order to survive. 
Therefore, the chain of transmission between poverty and corruption might be through 
growth in income. 
  
4.2: Analysis and Discussion of OLS System Equation 
The result of OLS system equation indicating the impacts of corruption on inclusive growth 
and other indicators from equations (4) through (10) are presented in Table (5). Starting with 
equation (4), the error correction term is significant at 1% and correctly signed. This implies 
about 14% of the deviation from equilibrium due to shock in from any of the varioables in the 
model is been restored.  Looking at the impacts of corruption on inclusive growth index, the 
result reveals that corruption (COR) has negative impacts on the achievements of inclusive 
growth at 10% level of significant in line with our expected result. A 1% increase in the rate 
of corruption in the country will result into about 7% decline in the inclusiveness of 
economic growth in the country.    From the result, the adjusted coefficient of determination 
(Adjusted R2) of 0.70 indicates that about 70% of the variation in the explanatory variables in 
Nigeria explains the level of INCG.  
 
In equation (6) with quality of rule of law as dependent variable, the result portrays the 
relationship between corruption and the quality of rule of law to be negative. From the result, 
it could be concluded that corruption has a negative impact on the effectiveness of rule of law 
hence discourages equality of opportunities and widens the gap of inequality. This is not 
surprising in Nigeria where corruption has eaten deep into the fabrics of the social formation. 
Equation (7) provides support in favour of the negative impact of corruption on Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI). The negative sign before the coefficient of (FDI) indicates that an 
increase in the level of corruption thus results into about 29% decline in the amount foreign 
direct investment, though the impact remains insignificant. The reason could be attributed to 
the fact that corruption increases cost of production and makes profit maximization 
objectively elusive hence, no private investor would be encouraged to invest his resources in 
such economy. 
 
The coefficient of corruption in the FDI equation portrays an insignificant positive 
relationship in between the two against our expected result. This indicates that an increase in 
the level of corruption spurs foreign direct investments in Nigeria. This may not be out of 
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place because corruption creates the avenue for tax evasion and weakened efficiency of rule 
of law. This allows entrepreneurs with highest bribe giver to win a bid, bypass inefficient 
bureaucracies, maximize profit at the expense of the economy, which serves as a impetus for 
a private foreign investors.  Domestic debt also exhibits a significant positive relationship 
with corruption as in equation (8). One should notes that an increasing rate of corruption 
distorts economic planning and hindered efficient allocation of scarce resources thereby 
encourages waste. Surprisingly not and correlates with apriori expectation, it is expected that 
as level of corruption worsened, debt rate increases about 21%.  The estimated error-
correction term (ECT) is negative, but statistically insignificant. This implies that there are no 
significant short-run effects of the explanatory variables on inclusive growth.    
 
In the present study, corruption has negative impact on per capita private consumption of an 
individual used as proxy for level of poverty (POV). This situation implies a reduction in 
standard of living of average citizens, increases the level of poverty and by deduction widens 
the inequality gap. In a specific term, a unit increase in the level of corruption would worsen 
the level of poverty by 3%. Previous studies had also found a negative relationship between 
level of corruption and poverty rate. For instance, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Ali and 
Isse (2003) had provided results in support of the fact that, in a country where economic 





























































ECMt-1 0.1437  -0.5988  0.5143  -0.7516  -0.1248  0.0469  0.1954 
 (0.0055)  (0.0410)  (0.1032)  (0.1032)  (0.3663)  (0.7501)  (0.0004) 
              
INCG 0.0655  -0.0459  -1.9646  0.8815  0.4131  0.1879  0.01543 
 (0.6494)  (0.9553)  (0.4963)  (0.4963)  (0.2888)  (0.6512)  (0.9199) 
              
COR -0.0752  0.0428  -0.2295  0.297230  0.2098  -0.0369  -0.1027 
 (0.0876)  (0.8637)  (0.4505)  (0.4505)  (0.0773)  (0.7700)  (0.0287) 
              
RL 0.02656  -0.2216  0.4854  -0.0124  0.1362  0.0156  0.04659 
 (0.4410)  (0.2594)  (0.9679)  (0.9679)  (0.1441)  (0.8754)  (0.2047) 
              
FDI 0.054167  0.147033  -0.2515  -0.4822  -0.0068  0.0255  0.0244 
 (0.0072)  (0.1960)  (0.0077)  (0.0077)  (0.8990)  (0.6576)  (0.2515) 
              
DD 0.0175  0.2358  0.3009  -0.2409  0.2659  -0.0676  -0.1488 
 (0.8128)  (0.5754)  (0.7168)  (0.7168)  (0.1835)  (0.7511)  (0.0598) 
              
POV 0.0879  0.5939  -0.7103  0.2922  0.4155  -0.5085  -0.0506 
 (0.3004)  (0.2192)  (0.7011)  (0.7011)  (0.0704)  (0.0385)  (0.5743) 
              
RGDP -0.8301  0.8118  1.7422  0.7362  0.0172  0.7565  0.2116 
 (0.0000)  (0.4082)  (0.6341)  (0.6341)  (0.9705)  (0.1286)  (0.2489) 
              
R
2
 0.70  0.34  0.47  0.48  0.35  0.25  0.48 
ADJ R
2
 0.59  0.11  0.29  0.30  0.12  -0.02  0.29 
D.W 1.81  2.24  1.93  2.08  1.83  1.73  2.08 
 
Notes*, **, and ** *denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Figures in parenthesis indicates 
the probability Values.  
Source: Authors’ Computations using E-view 9.1 
 
Finally, the coefficient of growth in income (RGDP) depicts a negative significant 
relationship between growth in income and level of corruption. This indicates that corruption 
has a declining impact on growth in income. This result gives further credence to the result of 
test of causality, which depicts that there is a unidirectional causality running from corruption 
to growth in income. The result provides evidence in support of earlier empirical findings of a 
dampening effect of corruption on growth in output by Egunjobi, (2013) and Mauro (1995) 
but refutes the empirical evidence of the earlier studies in support of those in the school of 
thought of “beneficial grease hypothesis”. The hypothesis is based on the premise that 
corruption (most especially public sector corruption) acts like oil that greases and facilitates 
economic growth since it helps government officials to process project approval more 
efficient. It also ensures the efficiency of the price mechanism which allows entrepreneurs 
with highest bribe giver to win a bid, bypass  inefficient bureaucracies, maximize output 
subject to given cost thereby produced at lowest cost of production. The present findings is 
against the earlier submission made by Huntington (1968), Friedrich (1972), Acemoglu and 
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Verdier (1998), that corruption facilitates efficiency in the economy and affects economic 
growth positively might not be out of place in an investment environment largely dominated 
by multinational companies, coupled high level of capital flight among corrupts public office 
holders.  
 
4.3: Post Estimation Test 
The diagnostic statistics are quite satisfactory. The Durbin-Watson (DW) Statistic for most of 
the equations are quite satisfactory ranging from 1.73 to 2.24 signifies absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals. Also, the Jaque-Bera (JB) statistics of about 12.43 and its 
associated p-value of (0.5720) which is greater than  5% level of  statistical significant shows 
the normality of the  residuals of the estimated model, indicating that the residuals are 
normally distributed. The test of serial correlation LM test rejects the null hypothesis of the 
existence of serial correlation with LM-Stat value of 35.3168 and its associated p-value of 
(0.9289). The insignificants p-value of (0.3284) for VEC residual heteroskedacity test result 




5.0: Summary and Conclusion 
The paper is an x-ray of the various ways corruption impact the achievement of an inclusive 
growth in Nigeria over a period of 1981 – 2014 using simple OLS techniques of estimation.  
Pre-estimation test were carried out which revealed that all the series in the model are 
stationary at 1(1) and there is existence of long run relationship among the variables in the 
model using   Johansen Cointegration test.  The study also employs the use of VAR Granger 
Causality test to   determine the chain of transmission among the variables. At lag 1, the 
result shows that there is a unidirectional causality running from corruption to inclusive 
growth, rule of law, and growth in income. Also, a bidirectional relationship exists between 
corruption and domestic debt while there is no causality of whatever form between corruption 
and poverty proxy by private consumption expenditure. The result further shows that between 
corruption and the fotreign Direct investment (FDI) the relationship is independent. This 
implies that there could not be a direct link between corruption on the level of POV and FDI 
but through a transmission mechanism. The result of the regression equation provides 
evidences to support the existing school of thought that corruption decreases growth in output 
and worsened the achievement of an inclusive growth. The economic implication is that the 
way and manner government allocates its budget or planned its expenditure encourages 
corruption, influences growth in income negatively and widened inequality gap. This view is 
supported by the model result which assumes a positive sign in between domestic debt and 
FDI, and a negative sign between inclusive growth, Per capita Private Consumption 
Expenditure proxy for Poverty, rule of law, and growth in output.   Overall, the above result 
supports the argument that corruption has damaging impact on the attainment of inclusive 
growth. An economy in which corruption strives could experience growth in income but the 
growth would remain remains non- inclusive due to increasing level of poverty, ineffective 
rule of law and high debt burden. The Nigerian experience of achieving growth of about 7% 
and above with an increasing rate of unemployment, poverty and widening gap of inequality 
is a corollary of the conclusion of this paper. Therefore, it is recommended that for Nigeria to 
achieve inclusive growth and sustainable development the strengthening capacity of the 
country to fight corruption becomes imperative.   
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VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: INCG COR RL DD FDI POV RGDP     
Exogenous variables: C      
Date: 02/03/16   Time: 09:37     
Sample: 1981 2014      
Included observations: 32     
              
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
              
0 -33.20971 NA   2.91e-08  2.513107  2.833737  2.619387 
1  136.0617  253.9071  1.71e-11 -5.003855  -2.438817* -4.153618 
2  212.5844   81.30535*   4.94e-12*  -6.724023* -1.914577  -5.129828* 
       
       
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    














































Appendix II: Johasen Cointegration Result 
 
Date: 02/03/16   Time: 10:01   
Sample (adjusted): 1983 2014   
Included observations: 32 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: INCG COR RL DD FDI POV RGDP    
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
          
None *  0.869259  170.0686  125.6154  0.0000 
At most 1 *  0.628914  104.9634  95.75366  0.0100 
At most 2 *  0.587358  73.24114  69.81889  0.0260 
At most 3  0.491828  44.91554  47.85613  0.0920 
At most 4  0.329324  23.25360  29.79707  0.2338 
At most 5  0.197892  10.47061  15.49471  0.2463 
At most 6  0.101200  3.414221  3.841466  0.0646 
     
     
 Trace test indicates 3 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     
None *  0.869259  65.10512  46.23142  0.0002 
At most 1  0.628914  31.72230  40.07757  0.3184 
At most 2  0.587358  28.32560  33.87687  0.1989 
At most 3  0.491828  21.66194  27.58434  0.2382 
At most 4  0.329324  12.78299  21.13162  0.4724 
At most 5  0.197892  7.056387  14.26460  0.4825 
At most 6  0.101200  3.414221  3.841466  0.0646 
          
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 



















Appendix III: Test of Causality Results 
Dependent variable: D(INCG)  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    D(COR)  4.663712 1  0.0308 
D(RL)  3.626516 1  0.0569 
D(FDI)  23.50583 1  0.0000 
D(DD)  18.91097 1  0.0000 
D(POV)  0.584580 1  0.4445 
D(RGDP)  36.60922 1  0.0000 
    
    All  71.03511 6  0.0000 
    
        
Dependent variable: D(COR)  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    D(INCG)  0.021958 1  0.8822 
D(RL)  3.395894 1  0.0654 
D(FDI)  0.356297 1  0.5506 
D(DD)  8.412892 1  0.0037 
D(POV)  1.419070 1  0.2336 
D(RGDP)  0.342114 1  0.5586 
    
    All  14.13623 6  0.0282 
    
        
Dependent variable: D(RL)  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    D(INCG)  4.613478 1  0.0317 
D(COR)  0.474291 1  0.4910 
D(FDI)  2.951162 1  0.0858 
D(DD)  0.370430 1  0.5428 
D(POV)  1.757585 1  0.1849 
D(RGDP)  2.400868 1  0.1213 
    
    All  6.395730 6  0.3803 
    
        
Dependent variable: D(FDI)  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    D(INCG)  0.170489 1  0.6797 
D(COR)  0.065008 1  0.7987 
D(RL)  0.011186 1  0.9158 
D(DD)  0.823179 1  0.3643 
D(POV)  0.069852 1  0.7916 
D(RGDP)  0.489737 1  0.4840 
    
    All  1.959405 6  0.9234 
    
        
Dependent variable: D(DD)  
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Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    D(INCG)  2.777157 1  0.0956 
D(COR)  9.738569 1  0.0018 
D(RL)  1.823637 1  0.1769 
D(FDI)  0.003529 1  0.9526 
D(POV)  9.245686 1  0.0024 
D(RGDP)  0.036359 1  0.8488 
    
    All  18.90843 6  0.0043 
    
        
Dependent variable: D(POV)  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    D(INCG)  0.855233 1  0.3551 
D(COR)  1.760828 1  0.1845 
D(RL)  0.036258 1  0.8490 
D(FDI)  0.257538 1  0.6118 
D(DD)  0.800581 1  0.3709 
D(RGDP)  1.617398 1  0.2035 
    
    All  6.907674 6  0.3295 
    
        
Dependent variable: D(RGDP)  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    D(INCG)  0.057861 1  0.8099 
D(COR)  2.625979 1  0.1051 
D(RL)  0.434348 1  0.5099 
D(FDI)  2.769506 1  0.0961 
D(DD)  2.717398 1  0.0993 
D(POV)  0.169175 1  0.6808 
    
    All  7.166299 6  0.3057 
    






















Appendix IV: Diagnostic Test 
VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h 
Date: 02/02/16   Time: 10:12 
Sample: 1981 2014  
Included observations: 32 
   
   Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   1  35.31680  0.9289 
2  40.35867  0.8056 
   
   
Probs from chi-square with 49 df. 
 
 
VEC Residual Normality Tests   
Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl)  
Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal  
Date: 02/02/16   Time: 10:13   
Sample: 1981 2014    
Included observations: 32   
     
          
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     1 -0.218094  0.253680 1  0.6145 
2  0.162400  0.140659 1  0.7076 
3 -0.336218  0.602894 1  0.4375 
4  0.414454  0.916120 1  0.3385 
5  0.475798  1.207381 1  0.2719 
6 -0.403523  0.868429 1  0.3514 
7  0.254132  0.344442 1  0.5573 
     
     Joint   4.333606 7  0.7407 
     
          
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     1  3.963493  1.237758 1  0.2659 
2  2.479574  0.361125 1  0.5479 
3  4.953082  5.086038 1  0.0241 
4  3.020891  0.000582 1  0.9808 
5  2.586071  0.228449 1  0.6327 
6  2.343765  0.574192 1  0.4486 
7  2.326102  0.605517 1  0.4365 
     
     Joint   8.093662 7  0.3244 
     
          
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.  
     
     1  1.491438 2  0.4744  
2  0.501784 2  0.7781  
3  5.688932 2  0.0582  
4  0.916701 2  0.6323  
5  1.435831 2  0.4878  
6  1.442621 2  0.4861  
7  0.949959 2  0.6219  
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Joint  12.42727 14  0.5720  
     
     
     
 
 
VEC Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests: No Cross Terms (only 
levels and squares) 
Date: 02/02/16   Time: 10:14  
Sample: 1981 2014   
Included observations: 32  
    
        
   Joint test:   
    
    Chi-sq df Prob.  
    
     460.7566 448  0.3284  
    




System Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations  
Null Hypothesis: no residual autocorrelations up to lag h  
Date: 01/31/16   Time: 21:17    
Sample: 1983 2014     
Included observations: 32    
      
      Lags Q-Stat Prob. Adj Q-Stat Prob. df 
      
      1  17.22164  1.0000  17.77718  1.0000 49 
2  51.64215  1.0000  54.49239  0.9999 98 
3  107.2983  0.9942  115.9061  0.9726 147 
4  139.5636  0.9992  152.7807  0.9902 196 
5  185.7538  0.9981  207.5246  0.9606 245 
6  218.7584  0.9996  248.1456  0.9757 294 
7  257.3763  0.9998  297.5766  0.9634 343 
8  302.9880  0.9997  358.3923  0.8873 392 
9  329.3572  1.0000  395.0798  0.9430 441 
10  363.9696  1.0000  445.4250  0.9262 490 
11  393.3757  1.0000  490.2344  0.9347 539 
12  424.2993  1.0000  539.7122  0.9235 588 
      
      *The test is valid only for lags larger than the System lag order. 
df is degrees of freedom for (approximate) chi-square distribution 



















Appendix V: Result of System Equations Order by Variables 
System: SYS03VAR   
Estimation Method: Least Squares  
Date: 01/31/16   Time: 18:34   
Sample: 1983 2014   
Included observations: 32   
Total system (balanced) observations 224  
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(1) 0.143700 0.051031 2.815962 0.0055 
C(2) 0.065508 0.143849 0.455391 0.6494 
C(3) -0.075164 0.043729 -1.718844 0.0876 
C(4) 0.026556 0.034381 0.772401 0.4410 
C(5) 0.054167 0.019884 2.724204 0.0072 
C(6) 0.017491 0.073757 0.237143 0.8128 
C(7) 0.087848 0.084550 1.039004 0.3004 
C(8) -0.830050 0.171788 -4.831827 0.0000 
C(9) 0.026090 0.017970 1.451855 0.1485 
C(10) -0.598771 0.290602 -2.060451 0.0410 
C(11) -0.045944 0.819172 -0.056086 0.9553 
C(12) 0.042831 0.249024 0.171995 0.8637 
C(13) -0.221612 0.195789 -1.131895 0.2594 
C(14) 0.147033 0.113230 1.298531 0.1960 
C(15) 0.235769 0.420023 0.561325 0.5754 
C(16) 0.593931 0.481484 1.233542 0.2192 
C(17) 0.811182 0.978276 0.829195 0.4082 
C(18) -0.019061 0.102334 -0.186264 0.8525 
C(19) 0.514274 0.270094 1.904056 0.0587 
C(20) -1.964537 0.761362 -2.580292 0.0108 
C(21) -0.229476 0.231450 -0.991470 0.3229 
C(22) 0.485423 0.181972 2.667573 0.0084 
C(23) -0.251537 0.105239 -2.390138 0.0180 
C(24) 0.300860 0.390382 0.770680 0.4420 
C(25) -0.710305 0.447506 -1.587252 0.1144 
C(26) 1.742159 0.909239 1.916063 0.0571 
C(27) -0.086305 0.095112 -0.907395 0.3656 
C(28) -0.751635 0.458583 -1.639036 0.1032 
C(29) 0.881482 1.292692 0.681896 0.4963 
C(30) 0.297230 0.392972 0.756364 0.4505 
C(31) -0.012441 0.308964 -0.040266 0.9679 
C(32) -0.482192 0.178683 -2.698596 0.0077 
C(33) -0.240862 0.662816 -0.363392 0.7168 
C(34) 0.292186 0.759805 0.384554 0.7011 
C(35) 0.736170 1.543766 0.476866 0.6341 
C(36) 0.142494 0.161488 0.882379 0.3789 
C(37) -0.124745 0.137696 -0.905945 0.3663 
C(38) 0.413139 0.388149 1.064381 0.2888 
C(39) 0.209816 0.117995 1.778174 0.0773 
C(40) 0.136182 0.092771 1.467937 0.1441 
C(41) -0.006822 0.053652 -0.127149 0.8990 
C(42) 0.265861 0.199020 1.335848 0.1835 
C(43) 0.415507 0.228142 1.821263 0.0704 
C(44) 0.017183 0.463538 0.037069 0.9705 
C(45) 0.116231 0.048489 2.397053 0.0177 
C(46) 0.046937 0.147125 0.319026 0.7501 
C(47) 0.187867 0.414727 0.452989 0.6512 
C(48) -0.036925 0.126075 -0.292880 0.7700 
C(49) 0.015562 0.099123 0.156992 0.8754 
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C(50) 0.025455 0.057326 0.444048 0.6576 
C(51) -0.067554 0.212648 -0.317679 0.7511 
C(52) -0.508536 0.243764 -2.086185 0.0385 
C(53) 0.756524 0.495278 1.527475 0.1286 
C(54) -0.015724 0.051809 -0.303496 0.7619 
C(55) 0.195407 0.054306 3.598252 0.0004 
C(56) 0.015425 0.153082 0.100763 0.9199 
C(57) -0.102739 0.046536 -2.207710 0.0287 
C(58) 0.046588 0.036588 1.273317 0.2047 
C(59) 0.024350 0.021160 1.150779 0.2515 
C(60) -0.148795 0.078492 -1.895680 0.0598 
C(61) -0.050642 0.089977 -0.562837 0.5743 
C(62) 0.211549 0.182815 1.157177 0.2489 
C(63) 0.057676 0.019124 3.015971 0.0030 
     
     Determinant residual covariance 1.88E-13   
     
          
Equation: D(INCG) = C(1)*( INCG(-1) + 0.919801731461*COR(-1) - 
        0.333152712967*RL(-1) + 0.268508220717*FDI(-1) + 
        0.292484861727*DD(-1) + 1.16711239448*POV(-1) - 2.95274481926 
        *RGDP(-1) + 58.5090231997 ) + C(2)*D(INCG(-1)) + C(3)*D(COR(-1))  
        + C(4)*D(RL(-1)) + C(5)*D(FDI(-1)) + C(6)*D(DD(-1)) + C(7)*D(POV(-1)) 
        + C(8)*D(RGDP(-1)) + C(9)  
Observations: 32   
R-squared 0.694918    Mean dependent var 0.003505 
Adjusted R-squared 0.588802    S.D. dependent var 0.083246 
S.E. of regression 0.053382    Sum squared resid 0.065540 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.812240    
     
Equation: D(COR) = C(10)*( INCG(-1) + 0.919801731461*COR(-1) - 
        0.333152712967*RL(-1) + 0.268508220717*FDI(-1) + 
        0.292484861727*DD(-1) + 1.16711239448*POV(-1) - 2.95274481926 
        *RGDP(-1) + 58.5090231997 ) + C(11)*D(INCG(-1)) + C(12)*D(COR( 
        -1)) + C(13)*D(RL(-1)) + C(14)*D(FDI(-1)) + C(15)*D(DD(-1)) + C(16) 
        *D(POV(-1)) + C(17)*D(RGDP(-1)) + C(18)  
Observations: 32   
R-squared 0.338713    Mean dependent var 0.047253 
Adjusted R-squared 0.108700    S.D. dependent var 0.321994 
S.E. of regression 0.303990    Sum squared resid 2.125428 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.236435    
     
Equation: D(RL) = C(19)*( INCG(-1) + 0.919801731461*COR(-1) - 
        0.333152712967*RL(-1) + 0.268508220717*FDI(-1) + 
        0.292484861727*DD(-1) + 1.16711239448*POV(-1) - 2.95274481926 
        *RGDP(-1) + 58.5090231997 ) + C(20)*D(INCG(-1)) + C(21)*D(COR( 
        -1)) + C(22)*D(RL(-1)) + C(23)*D(FDI(-1)) + C(24)*D(DD(-1)) + C(25) 
        *D(POV(-1)) + C(26)*D(RGDP(-1)) + C(27)  
Observations: 32   
R-squared 0.469685    Mean dependent var 0.031250 
Adjusted R-squared 0.285228    S.D. dependent var 0.334189 
S.E. of regression 0.282537    Sum squared resid 1.836029 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.924885    
     
Equation: D(FDI) = C(28)*( INCG(-1) + 0.919801731461*COR(-1) - 
        0.333152712967*RL(-1) + 0.268508220717*FDI(-1) + 
        0.292484861727*DD(-1) + 1.16711239448*POV(-1) - 2.95274481926 
        *RGDP(-1) + 58.5090231997 ) + C(29)*D(INCG(-1)) + C(30)*D(COR( 
        -1)) + C(31)*D(RL(-1)) + C(32)*D(FDI(-1)) + C(33)*D(DD(-1)) + C(34) 
        *D(POV(-1)) + C(35)*D(RGDP(-1)) + C(36)  
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Observations: 32   
R-squared 0.482154    Mean dependent var 0.084119 
Adjusted R-squared 0.302033    S.D. dependent var 0.574198 
S.E. of regression 0.479711    Sum squared resid 5.292812 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.075971    
     
Equation: D(DD) = C(37)*( INCG(-1) + 0.919801731461*COR(-1) - 
        0.333152712967*RL(-1) + 0.268508220717*FDI(-1) + 
        0.292484861727*DD(-1) + 1.16711239448*POV(-1) - 2.95274481926 
        *RGDP(-1) + 58.5090231997 ) + C(38)*D(INCG(-1)) + C(39)*D(COR( 
        -1)) + C(40)*D(RL(-1)) + C(41)*D(FDI(-1)) + C(42)*D(DD(-1)) + C(43) 
        *D(POV(-1)) + C(44)*D(RGDP(-1)) + C(45)  
Observations: 32   
R-squared 0.349383    Mean dependent var 0.181973 
Adjusted R-squared 0.123081    S.D. dependent var 0.153817 
S.E. of regression 0.144040    Sum squared resid 0.477193 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.833397    
     
Equation: D(POV) = C(46)*( INCG(-1) + 0.919801731461*COR(-1) - 
        0.333152712967*RL(-1) + 0.268508220717*FDI(-1) + 
        0.292484861727*DD(-1) + 1.16711239448*POV(-1) - 2.95274481926 
        *RGDP(-1) + 58.5090231997 ) + C(47)*D(INCG(-1)) + C(48)*D(COR( 
        -1)) + C(49)*D(RL(-1)) + C(50)*D(FDI(-1)) + C(51)*D(DD(-1)) + C(52) 
        *D(POV(-1)) + C(53)*D(RGDP(-1)) + C(54)  
Observations: 32   
R-squared 0.244646    Mean dependent var 0.001463 
Adjusted R-squared -0.018086    S.D. dependent var 0.152530 
S.E. of regression 0.153903    Sum squared resid 0.544780 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.732062    
     
Equation: D(RGDP) = C(55)*( INCG(-1) + 0.919801731461*COR(-1) - 
        0.333152712967*RL(-1) + 0.268508220717*FDI(-1) + 
        0.292484861727*DD(-1) + 1.16711239448*POV(-1) - 2.95274481926 
        *RGDP(-1) + 58.5090231997 ) + C(56)*D(INCG(-1)) + C(57)*D(COR( 
        -1)) + C(58)*D(RL(-1)) + C(59)*D(FDI(-1)) + C(60)*D(DD(-1)) + C(61) 
        *D(POV(-1)) + C(62)*D(RGDP(-1)) + C(63)  
Observations: 32   
R-squared 0.479606    Mean dependent var 0.040544 
Adjusted R-squared 0.298600    S.D. dependent var 0.067831 
S.E. of regression 0.056808    Sum squared resid 0.074224 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.083091    
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
